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HARMLESS ERROR: ABETTOR OF
COURTROOM MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution protects individual rights and liber-
ties by restricting the actions of governmental entities. Neither the fed-
eral nor the state government may deprive an individual of life, liberty,
or property without the fair procedure or "due process" required by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.' These guarantees are particularly
important in the area of criminal justice. A criminal conviction is not
only a determination of guilt in fact; it is an establishment of legal guilt
following settled procedural rules that are based on societal notions of
fairness and on constitutional rights. 2 Society and the courts have a sig-
nificant interest in promoting confidence in the administration of jus-
tice, and in preserving the judicial process from contamination by
courses of action found illegal or deemed unfair.3
Not all errors occurring at trial require reversal of the resulting con-
viction. Errors that affect neither the rights of the defendant nor the
integrity of the judicial process may be overlooked. Currently, however,
the harmless error doctrine focuses exclusively on the effect of an error
on the defendant: if an error did not affect the defendant's "substantial
rights," it will be adjudged harmless.4 This doctrine of harmless error,
I "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law," U.S. CONST. amend. V; "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
2 "[Conviction] is different, or may be, from guilt in fact. It is guilt in law, established by
the judgment of laymen." Kotteakos v. United States, $28 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
3 See genera/y Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
4 The present harmless error statute reads: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record with-
out regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28
U.S.C. § 2111 (1976).
Harmless error rules also are found in collections of federal rules: "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R.
GRIM. P. 52(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 103(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
In addition, all fifty states have adopted harmless error statutes or rules. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Supreme Court, however, has not clearly defined
"substantial rights," resulting in a series of ad hoc and vague decisions. Whether a particular
right is a substantial right, essential to a fair trial, has been determined on a case by case basis
without the formulation of an objective standard. Compare Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323
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then, is designed to prevent inconsequential errors from upsetting a law-
ful conviction while preserving the fairness of a trial.5 A fair trial, how-
ever, does not depend only on the factual guilt of a particular
defendant. It is grounded in the overall integrity of the judicial system.6
Many state and federal procedural rules that govern the criminal
judicial process monitor the conduct of prosecutors and judges during
trial.7 These rules assure that the verdict is based only on competent
evidence by proscribing behavior that would give rise to unprovable in-
ferences regarding the guilt of the accused. Recurrent violations of such
trial rules bias criminal trials in favor of the prosecution and deny de-
fendants the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. This is indeed
what has occurred. The repeated application of a harmless error stan-
dard to violations of these trial rules has resulted in repeated violations
of these rules by prosecutors and judges.8 Appellate court expressions of
disapproval and warnings of impropriety provide little deterrent if con-
(1970) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge) (all
constitutional errors requiring automatic reversal) with Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969) (admission of confession of codefendant who did not take the stand); Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (illegally admitted evidence); Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's failure to testify) (all constitutional
errors receiving harmless error tests). But see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 83 (1967) (attempting to harmonize the Court's decisions).
For examples of vague decisions regarding harmless error, see Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371 (1972) (if Miranda violation occurred, it was harmless); Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254
(overwhelming untainted evidence to support conviction, therefore cumulative illegal admis-
sion of codefendants' confession harmless; but "[w]e do not suggest that, if evidence bearing
on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted,
is harmless error"); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (defendant entitled to a new trial
because state court erroneously held the admission of evidence in violation of the exclusionary
rule was not prejudicial).
5 See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
6 See Note, The Superisoiy Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1659 (1963).
7 These rules encompass rules of evidence as well as court directives in decisions. For
example, a prosecutor may not present evidence of the defendant's past crimes, wrongs, or
other acts to invite the jury to conclude that it is therefore more likely than it otherwise would
be that the defendant committed the crime for which he is being tried. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
Similarly, a prosecutor may not inject into his or her closing argument any extrinsic or in-
flammatory matter that has no basis in the evidence. United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d
693 (5th Cir. 1980). A trial judge may not abuse his or her discretion in controlling the scope
of the closing argument by preventing the defense counsel from making a point essential to
the defense. United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
8 The academic commentators who have examined the problem of prosecutorial mis-
conduct have almost universally bemoaned its frequency. . . . They have referred to
reversal as a 'quasi sanction' and have said, "Appellate justices time and time again have
condemned .. .poor conduct and warned prosecutors to keep within the bounds of
propriety. Later opinions reflect the result-frustrating failure."
Alsehuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 631, 645
(1972); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980) ("A federal
prosecutor in final argument has done it again. . . .The problem is not new. It continues to
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victions resulting from error-tainted trials are allowed to stand.9
Although the duty of the prosecutor is "to seek justice, not merely
to convict,"' 0 the adversarial system demands aggressive advocacy to
the limit of the law. Holding these errors harmless extends that limit.II
Indeed, because conviction, not justice, is frequently the primary object
of prosecutors,' 2 and seemingly, of some trial judges, 13 the systematic
application of harmless error standards encourages deliberate violations
of longstanding trial rules.
This Comment contends that deliberate violations of rules which
regulate the conduct of prosecutors and judges at trial should not be
measured by a harmless error standard, but should result in automatic
reversals of convictions. Automatic reversals of this class of error would
create a most effective deterrent against the erosion of defendants' due
process rights14 and would preserve the integrity of our criminal justice
system.
II. THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND CURRENT
STATUS
As early as the eighteenth century, English courts applied a harm-
less error rule in criminal appeals: if the evidence excluding the error
was "ample," the judges would "not think themselves bound to stop the
course of justice."' 5 Later courts varied the rule, changing to a stricter
standard,' 6 then reverting to the earlier standard which required rever-
sal if the error might have affected the jurors. 17 The final common law
version, known as the Exchequer Rule, required a presumption of
prejudice and virtually automatic reversal of convictions upon a show-
arise with disturbing frequency throughout this circuit despite the admonition of trial judges
and this court.")
9 See, e.g., infra notes 58-59 & 64-65 and accompanying text.
10 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.1 (1980); see also Goldberg,
Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 438-39 (1980).
11 See, e.g.,in/ra notes 53-65 and accompanying text; see also Rodiguez, 627 F.2d at 110-112.
12 See, e.g., infra notes 59-60, 64-65 & 66 and accompanying text; see also Seymour, Why
Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956).
13 See, e.g., in/a notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also Alschulersupra note 8, at 693.
14 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 646-47; Inbau, Restrictions on the Law oInterrogation and
Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 77, 78 (1957); see also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 201-03
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15 See Rex v. Ball, 168 Eng. Rep. 721 n.(b) (K.B. 1807) (discussing Tzkler's Case, an unre-
ported 1781 decision). Rex v. Ball restated the Tikler rule, requiring reversal if the error
"might be supposed to have had an effect on the minds of the jury." Ball, 168 Eng. Rep., at
722.
16 Affirmance would be required only when the appellate court was satisfied that the jury
decided correctly. Doe v. Tyler, 130 Eng. Rep. 1397 (C.P. 1830).
17 The court reasoned that the Doe v. 7yler rule compelled appellate judges to invade the
province of the jury. Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
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ing of error.' 8 Under this rule, convictions were reversed even for trivial
errors, and cases were remanded for retrials.19 Thus, the Exchequer
Rule generated more retrials than new prosecutions, extending litiga-
tion, in some instances, for decades. 20
Most American courts adopted the Exchequer Rule, creating a sim-
ilar backlog and delay. 2 1 In Williams v. State,22 the court reversed a mur-
der conviction because the indictment described the offense as "against
the peace of the state" rather than "against the peace and dignity of the
state."'23 Similarly, in State v. Campbell,24 the court reversed a rape con-
viction because of an omission of "the" before the words "peace and
dignity" in the indictment. 25 The rule was harshly criticized by some
judges and commentators.2 6 In response, "to prevent matters concerned
with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae
of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict,' 27 Congress in 1919
passed a harmless error statute:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to tech-
nical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties. 28
The harmless error statute was at first interpreted to be inapplica-
ble to constitutional errors.29 It was not until 1963 in Fay v. Connecti-
18 The Exchequer Rule was a misinterpretation of the Crease v. Barrett test, supra note 17
and accompanying text. See, e.g., Rex v. Gibson, 18 Q.B.D. 537 (1887); Wright v. Tatham, 7
A. &E. 313 (1837); Rutzen v. Farr, 111 Eng. Rep. 707 (KB. 1835); see also R. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 4-12 (1970); cf. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
19 See generally R. TRAYNOR, supra note 18. The Exchequer Rule was criticized for need-
lessly protracting litigation. In response, Parliament enacted the Criminal Appeal Act of
1907, 7 Edw., ch. 23, § 4(1), requiring reversal only when there was a substantial miscarriage
of justice.
20 See generaly R. TRAYNOR, supra note 18.
21 Id. at 13.
22 27 Wis. 402 (1871).
23 Id. at 403.
24 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 706 (1908).
25 Id. at 227-28, 109 S.W. at 711.
26 See, e.g., Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 617-18, 23 So. 210, 225-26 (1898) (Whitfield,
J., dissenting); State v. Musgrave, 43 W. Va. 672, 710, 28 S.E. 813, 828-29 (1897) (Brannon,
J., dissenting); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758-60 nn. 10-14 (1946) (list-
ing judges and commentators).
27 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
28 Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. For the current version of this statute, see
supra note 4.
29 See, e.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65. A constitutional error is a violation of a constitu-
tional mandate. For an example of a violation of the fifth amendment right against self-




cut3 0 that the Supreme Court indicated the possibility of a federal
constitutional error being adjudged harmless. Four years later, in Chap-
man v. California,31 the Court concluded that some constitutional errors
"are so unimportant and insignificant" that they may, without violating
the Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic re-
versal of the conviction.3 2 In order for these "insignificant" constitu-
tional errors to be deemed harmless, the reviewing court must be certain
that they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 3 The burden is on
the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in
question did not influence the verdict.3 4 The Court, however, neglected
to formulate any test or standard for differentiating between constitu-
tional errors which require automatic reversal of convictions and those
"insignificant" constitutional errors which may be harmless. Indeed,
the Court merely included a footnote giving three examples of constitu-
tional errors requiring automatic reversal.3 5 This lack of a standard has
caused commentators both to criticize the Court and to attempt to im-
pose a method of weighing the significance of a constitutional error.3 6
The harmless error statute was passed to curb reversals upon a
showing of a "technical" error. In interpreting the statute, the Court
included in this category most errors not violating explicit constitutional
rights.3 7 For a non-constitutional error to be harmless, a reviewing
court, after considering the entire record, need only find "with fair as-
surance" that the judgment "was not substantially swayed by the er-
ror."38 Moreover, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
30 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963).
31 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
32 Id. at 22.
33 Id. at 24.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon, Payne and Tumy, discussed supra note 4).
36 Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of the Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976) ("At least three possibilities for demonstrating
harmlessness appear in Supreme Court opinions: . . . Supreme Court opinions often do not
distinguish between these variant approaches, although the approach selected can change the
disposition of many cases."); Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. GRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 421,422 (1980) ("[IThe doctrine of harmless constitutional error destroys
important constitutional and institutional values and therefore should be discarded.');
Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error. The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L.
REV. 519, 557 (1969) ("[T]he Court, if only in an effort to further the interest of net judicial
economy, should attempt to delineate certain well-defined classes of constitutional error
which require automatic reversal.'); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV.
988, 988 (1973) ("Chaos surrounds the standard for appellate review of errors in criminal
proceedings. . . . Missing from past efforts has been an attempt to relate harmless error rules
to standards of proof at trial.');see also Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83
(1967).
37 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
38 Id. at 765.
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error affected his substantial rights, resulting in prejudice.3 9
The standard of prejudice in such cases, however, still eludes exact
definition. Indeed, recently in United States v. Frad,4 the Supreme
Court, noting that previous Supreme Court cases had given the term
"prejudice" no "precise content," specifically left the word undefined.4 '
The Court in Frady held that for a conviction to be reversed on collateral
appeal,4 2 the defendant must show that the errors at trial "worked to
[the defendant's] actual and substantial disadvantage. ' 43 This language
implies that on direct review, the defendant might have to show that the
error created a possibility of prejudice.44 Reviewing courts, however,
have held on direct review that a " 'bare possibility' that [the] defendant
may have suffered prejudice is not enough to overturn a guilty ver-
dict."'4 5 In fact, some reviewing courts reason circuitously that when the
defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, the error did not result in
prejudice, and, because there was no prejudice, the defendant received a
fair trial.46 Under this reasoning, the convictions should therefore be
affirmed. Other courts simply conclude without explanation that the
error is not prejudicial.4 7
39 Id. at 760.
40 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
41 Id. at 1595.
42 A collateral appeal, as contrasted with a direct appeal, is an action having an in-
dependent purpose and expecting a result other than the reversing of the judgment, although
it may be essential to the success of the collateral appeal that the judgment be reversed. A
habeas corpus proceeding is one example of a collateral proceeding.
43 Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1596.
44 The Supreme Court has not defined prejudice on direct review. Lower reviewing
courts likewise do not define prejudice in deciding whether it is present in a particular case.
The Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of prejudice in the context of habeas corpus
proceedings.
45 State v. Norris, 26 N.C. App. 259, 263, 215 S.E.2d 875, 877, cert. dismzssed, 288 N.C. 249,
217 S.E.2d 673 (1975),cer. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); see also United States v. Rochan, 563
F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A clear effect on the jury is required to reverse for comment
by the trial judge."); Fountain v. State, 382 A.2d 230, 231 (Del. 1980) ("A defendant must
show not only that a violation occurred but that it actually had a prejudicial effect."); Harrell
v. State, 405 So. 2d 480, 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("Absent proof of actual reliance by
the jury, or absent the presence of constitutional error, the standard of trial fairness applies,
and the burden remains on the defendant to prove the error resulted in an unfair trial."
(citations ommitted)); State v. Blaney, 284 S.E.2d 920, 924 (W. Va. 1981) ("The general rule
in this State is that '[a] verdict of guilty in a criminal case will not be reversed by this Court
because of error committed by the trial court, unless the error is prejudicial to the
accused.' ").
46 See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 463 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v.
England, 474 Pa. 1, 17, 375 A.2d 1292, 1300 (1977).
47 See, e.g., Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 353-54 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1092 (1980); Rupard v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Ky. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1, 9, 326 A.2d 303, 307 (1974); Commonwealth v. Marvel, 271 Pa.
Super. 11, 13-14, 411 A.2d 1254, 1256 (1979). In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court defined a
technical error only to the extent of contrasting it with an error of which the "natural effect is
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When an error concededly may be prejudicial, reviewing courts
most frequently refute the defendant's assertion of prejudice by indicat-
ing that the trial judge "cured" any possible prejudice with instructions
to the jury to disregard the error.4 8 These instructions to disregard are
often bland by comparison with the error they allegedly cure.49 Profes-
sor Alschuler, in an article based on his study of courtroom misconduct,
suggests, more in jest than in earnest, that the trial judge should indig-
nantly contradict the prosecutor's improper statements as an effective
counter-balance. 50 This, as Professor Alschuler admits, is not a realistic
possibility.5 Thus, courts continue to affirm convictions even in the
presence of substantial errors because trial judges continue to recite,
"Objection sustained; the jury will disregard . .. ."
III. COURTROOM MISCONDUCT AND THE HARMLESS ERROR
STANDARD
The policy underlying the rules that regulate prosecutorial and ju-
dicial conduct at trial dictates shielding the jury from matters upon
which no evidence can be offered and which are likely to influence the
verdict.52 Behavior which violates these rules often gives rise to unfavor-
able inferences regarding the guilt of the accused.53 Such conduct cre-
ates extraneous considerations which unduly influence the jury by
suggesting they decide on an improper basis, usually an emotional one.
For example, it is error for a prosecutor to attempt to persuade the
jurors of the defendant's guilt by overt appeal to their passions or
prejudices.5 4 Invoking the jurors' racial prejudices55 or their sympathies
to prejudice a 1Iligant's substantial rights." 328 U.S. at 765. If the error is "technical," the
defendant has the burden of proving that the error affected his substantial rights resulting in
prejudice. Id. at 760. If an error is "technical," however, it does not prejudice a defendant's
substantial rights by definition. Id. at 765.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126
(1981); United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 985 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Carrion,
463 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Gilkey, 181 Colo. 103, 106, 507 P.2d 855, 857
(1973); State v. Macomber, 18 Or. App. 163, 169-70, 524 P.2d 574, 577 (1974).
49 United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1382 (1982) ("The counsel, ladies and gentle-
men ofthejury, are not permitted to express their own opinions. The opinion must be found
by you as to what the facts may be."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 735 (1983); State v. King, 110
Ariz. 36, 42, 514 P.2d 1032, 1038 (1973) ("If any comment of counsel has no basis in the
evidence you are to disregard that comment.").
50 Alschuler, supra note 8, at 653-54.
51 Id.
52 Violations of these rules may be either constitutional or non-constitutional errors, de-
pending on whether a constitutional mandate is violated. See supra note 29.
53 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 652; see also Singer, Forensic Miscondtw by Federal Prosecu-
tors-And How It Giew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227, 261 (1968).
54 See, e.g., People v. Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d 661, 675, 104 Cal. Rptr. 812, 821-22 (1972);
Williford v. State, 142 Ga. App. 162, 162, 235 S.E.2d 625, 626 (1977); State v. McDermott,
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for the victim 56 or the victim's family57 does not further the proof of any
particular defendant's guilt. A prosecutor asks the jurors to think about
the victim,
[w]ho is carried out on this isolated dead end road and stabbed seven-
teen times in and about the body and had his throat cut and bled to death.
And as the life flowed from him and flowed from that neck where the
defendant had cut and cut and Dr. Hudson said one cut went around to
the back of the neck, and what did he think of as he lay there dying and
the blood rolling out of his neck in the dirt road, did he think about his
mother that he lived with and cared for? . . .Did he think of his brothers
and sisters when he knew that his life was sputtering from his neck that he
would never see again. Did he think of them? What does a person who
knows that he is dying a horrible death think of?58
Another prosecutor, referring to the victim's step-daughter, exhorts the
jurors: "[T]hink of the terror of this little girl Jennifer if this man is
allowed to walk the streets. ... [D]on't let him out so he may kill some-
one else." 5 9 A third prosecutor remarks:
[I]t is unfortunate that I do not have sitting beside me a member of the
family so that it would be flesh and blood and you could see the suffering
and the pain that such individual has gone through because of such an
incident as was committed by this monster, this executioner. 60
By playing on the jurors' sympathies in this manner, the prosecutor tam-
pers with the presumption of innocence that is every defendant's right.
Such appeals to the sympathies and prejudices of the jurors improperly
tip the scales against the defendant. These emotional appeals tend to
distract the jury from the main question of what happened on the occa-
sion at issue. Thus, the defendant is unfairly burdened: not only must
the defense rebut the prosecution's evidence; the defense must also
counter negative implications that may be difficult to erase from jurors'
202 Kan. 399, 404-05, 449 P.2d 545, 550, cerl. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); State v. King, 299
N.C. 707, 712-13, 264 S.E.2d 40, 44 (1980).
55 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 288 N.C. 582, 599, 220 S.E.2d 326, 338 (1975).
56 State v. King, 299 N.C. at 711-13, 264 S.E.2d at 43-44 (for excerpt of prosecutor's
closing argument see infra text accompanying note 58); State v. Fleetwood, 75 Wash. 2d 80,
84, 448 P.2d 502, 505 (1968) (prosecutor in argument emphasized that victim was an eighty-
seven year old woman who had been assaulted and had sustained a brutal beating).
57 Williford v. State, 142 Ga. App. 162, 162, 235 S.E.2d 625, 626 (1977) (prosecutor in
argument to the jury, referring to the victim: "'[H]e was a married man. His wife just had a
baby, but he's not here to see that.' "); State v. McDermott, 202 Kan. 399, 404-05, 449 P.2d
545, 550 (prosecutor in argument to the jury refers to the victim's stepdaughter), cerl. denied,
396 U.S. 912 (1969); State v. King, 299 N.C. at 712, 264 S.E.2d at 44 (prosecutor in closing
argument: "'Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this man died. There had been a death here.
A horrible death, and there was a funeral, and his family has been brave and tried to be brave
but what went through their minds as they went to the cemetery?' ").
58 State v. King, 299 N.C. at 711-12, 264 S.E.2d at 43-44.
59 State v. McDermott, 202 Kan. at 404-05, 449 P.2d at 550.




Prosecutors likewise err when they comment on the accused's si-
lence.62 In Grifi v. Califomia,63 the Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment forbids both references by the prosecutor to the accused's
silence and instructions by the court that this silence is evidence of guilt.
Even without such instructions, the prosecutor's intent that the jury
draw such an inference is usually unmistakable. By commenting on the
defendant's silence, the prosecutor improperly suggests to the jurors that
if the defendant were innocent and had nothing to hide he would testify
on his own behalf. Because the defendant has not done so, the prosecu-
tor encourages the jury to find the defendant guilty. A prosecutor con-
cludes in his closing argument to the jury: "It's a common defense
technique to put on trial. . . everybody involved in the case except the
defendant, in order to distract your attention from the real issues in this
case. . . . [A]sk the defendant to explain. . ask the defendant how he
explains. . . ask him to explain those things .... ,,64 Another prosecu-
tor states more directly: "Mr. Harris showed you and told you what
happened at the outset. Only he and this defendant were present at
those initial meetings. . . .The only two people that can bring out that
testimony are the people that were there, and we have brought you the
testimony of Mr. Harris. '65
In a criminal jury trial, the judge should grant a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal if the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the government, is so scant that the jury would merely be speculating
as to the defendant's guilt.66 If, however, a reasonably minded jury may
have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the case should be
submitted to the jury.67 A prosecutor invites the jurors to agree with
what the prosecutor claims is the judge's alleged opinion and to find the
61 See supra note 53; see also State v. Woodward, 21 Ariz. App. 133, 135, 516 P.2d 589, 591
(1973) ("we are all aware of the difficulty and the futility of attempting to erase improper
statements from ajuror's mind by presenting an objection with a motion to strike."); State v.
Kennedy, 272 S.C. 231, 233, 250 S.E.2d 338, 339-40 (1978) (State's argument that remark was
not prejudicial in view of trial judge's curative instructions to the jury was "patently naive
and without merit.').
62 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980). Although
this error violates the fifth amendment, it is not reversible per se. See Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967) and discussion supra note 4. This Comment focuses on the Gr'ft rule (see
text accompanying note 63) as a procedural trial rule rather than as a constitutionally man-
dated rule. It is easier for a defendant to get a conviction reversed for a constitutional error.
Compare Chapman, supra note 4, at 23 with Kotteakos, supra note 37, at 764-65.
63 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
64 State v. Macomber, 18 Or. App. 163, 168, 524 P.2d 574, 576 (1974).
65 United States v. Wilkerson, 534 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1976).
66 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
67 United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441,448 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Frol, 518 F.2d
1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir. 1973).
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defendant guilty when he tells the jury, "if you didn't have enough facts
to decide this case and that the defendants are guilty, this case wouldn't
be given to you. The Judge would take it away from you."' 68
Trial rules also forbid a presiding judge from disparaging a defend-
ant or defense counsel in front of the jury.6 9 Because of the trial judge's
role during trial and the respect for this role that the jurors hold, the
trial judge must abstain from conduct that tends to discredit the ac-
cused. 70 When a judge, seeing the defense counsel leave a knife, intro-
duced into evidence, on a table within easy reach of the defendant,
exclaims, "Step over here with the knife, don't leave that there. . . . I
don't want that exhibit left anywhere where this man can get to it,"71
the jurors can only conclude that the judge knows something the jurors
do not know regarding the guilt of the accused. A judge conveys the
same impermissible impression by resorting to sarcasm. For example, in
one case the defense offered evidence tending to show that it was not the
defendant who had attacked the victim with a knife. There the trial
judge's comment that the victim "must have fallen into a lawn mower,"
and his warning to the jurors not to go "view the scene. No telling what
might happen-might fall into the lawn mower," 72 denied the defend-
ant an impartial trial.
Because our adversarial system equates the interests of the defense
counsel with those of the defendant, 73 the trial judge, in the interests of
68 Rupard v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Ky. 1971).
69 See, e.g., State v. Holden, 280 N.C. 426, 429-30, 185 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (1972).
70 United States v. Cox, 664 F.2d 257, 259 (1 1th Cir. 1981); United States v. McDonald,
576 F.2d 1350, 1358 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 830, 439 U.S. 927 (1978).
71 State v. Wendel, 532 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). The defendant's conviction
was reversed. If the comments are not as extreme, however, the conviction will be affirmed.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marvel, 271 Pa. Super. 11, 14, 411 A.2d 1254, 1256 (1979) (trial
judge responding to defense counsel's explanation that his question was proper: "I am the
one who finally decides those matters in this case. I haven't lost one yet in here," held not
prejudicial.)
72 State v. Whitted, 38 N.C. App. 603, 605, 248 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1978). The defendant's
conviction was reversed. In other cases, where the trial was punctuated with sarcastic com-
ments of the trial judge, convictions may be affirmed. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 26 N.C. App.
259, 263, 215 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1975) (exchange between trial judge and defense counsel in the
jury's presence:
[Defense counsel]: Your-Honor, I'd like to be heard on a motion, if I could at this time
out of the presence of the jury. [Court]: You want to be heard on it? [Defense counsel]:
I would like to, yes sir, for the purpose of the record. [Court]: Ladies and Gentlemen,
I'll have to let you go to your jury room again. It won't be long. I don't know as how I
would light up a cigarette.);
see also United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d at 1358 ("We have reviewed the record with
care and have found that, although a few of the judge's remarks were sharp, even sarcastic,
they do not represent an abuse of discretion that warrants a new trial.") (Significantly, these
sarcastic remarks were not reproduced in the appellate opinion.).
73 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4- 1.1 and accompanying com-
mentary 4-7 to 4-11 (1980).
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fairness, may not display hostility toward the defense counsel. 74 When
the judge repeatedly reprimands the defense counsel in front of the jury,
for instance, by responding to an objection with "I have never heard of
such an objection. . .[s]how me your authority for any such ridiculous
assumption, ' 75 the judge undermines the necessary neutrality of the
trial. Violations of these and similar rules76 attack the credibility of the
defendant and improperly benefit the prosecutor.
The rules regulating the conduct of prosecutors and judges at trial
have been clearly established. The sixth amendment grants every per-
son charged with a crime an absolute right to a fair and impartial
trial.77 In order for a jury to convict a defendant, the prosecution must
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by presenting only proper,
competent, and relevant evidence. 78 As early as 1889, a court noted that
the prosecutor should be an impartial officer of the court rather than a
"heated partisan," and that "heated zeal" has no place in a prosecutor's
work.79 In 1935, the Supreme Court warned prosecutors to refrain from
using improper methods to secure convictions. 80 In 1923, a federal ap-
74 See,e.g., People v. DeJesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 522, 369 N.E.2d 752, 755, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196,
199 (1977) ("the Bench must be scrupulously free from and above even the appearance or
taint of partiality.").
75 United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (the defend-
ant's conviction was reversed). But see, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 463 F.2d 704, 707 n. 1
(9th Cir. 1972) (examples of exchanges between the trial court and defense counsel character-
ized by the appellate court as improper but not prejudicial:
[Court]: Do you see any necessity for the question really?
[Defense counsel]: Yes, your Honor, to impeach the witness.
[Court]: Well, I don't really believe you but I will let you do it.
[Court]: Let it be said that you never close a day without complicating something. I am
glad we are not in a hospital. I can just imagine that the doctor would be put to sleep
instead of the patient.);
Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 353 (D.C. 1979) (appellate court characterizing nu-
merous comments by the trial judge as ridiculing defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092
(1980); State v. Holden, 280 N.C. 426, 430, 185 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1972) ("The judge's critical
remarks were indiscreet and improper and should not have been made. . . . [W]e hold that
the comments . . . constituted harmless error.").
76 The examples given of rules monitoring prosecutorial and judicial behavior are not
exhaustive. For additional examples see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard
3-5.8 (1980).
77 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Deutch
v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
79 Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 269-70, 18 A. 737, 738 (1889).
80 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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pellate court noted, "It is an important rule that an attorney at law
appearing in open court in the trial of a case is entitled to such treat-
ment from the court that the interests of his client may not be
prejudiced. That is not a matter of indulgence, but of right."," The
Supreme Court in 1927 underscored the defendant's right to an impar-
tial judge by reversing a conviction because of a possibility that the
judge was influenced by extraneous considerations. 82 Since then, re-
viewing courts have repeatedly reprimanded prosecutors and trial
judges for misconduct at trial.8 3 Thus, prosecutors and trial judges are
well aware of the standards which their conduct must meet.
Prosecutorial errors often occur because the prosecutor is trying un-
conditionally to secure a conviction.84 The adversarial system demands
aggressive advocacy to the limit of the law.85 Although prosecutors owe
a special obligation of fairness in seeing that justice is done,86 they often
come close to committing reversible error in order to secure a convic-
tion.8 7 Reviewing courts repeatedly express disapproval of improper
prosecutorial conduct, yet affirm the convictions.8 8 Courts apply the
harmless error standard and focus on the weight of the evidence or on
81 Grock v. United States, 289 F. 544, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
82 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
83 Alschuler, supra note 8, at 645; see United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d at 110, 112;
United States v. Carrion, 463 F.2d at 709; State v. Juarez, I11 Ariz. 119, 121, 524 P.2d 155,
157 (1974); People v. Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22; Washam v. State,
235 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Del. 1967); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d at 353; State v. Miller,
288 N.C. 582, 601, 220 S.E.2d 326, 339 (1975); Thomas v. State, 496 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973).
84 See Rodriguez, 627 F.2d at 112 (The Seventh Circuit, reversing the conviction because of
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's silence at trial, wrote:
The problem is not new. It continues to arise with disturbing frequency throughout this
circuit despite the admonition of trial judges and this court. Usually it has been caused
by subtle prosecutorial comments, e.g., that certain evidence is "uncontradicted." Even
subtle references to the fact that a defendant has not testified have been con-
demned. . . . This court is beginning to experience a . . . sense of futility from the
persistent disregard of prior admonitions.);
see also United States v. Banks, 687 F.2d 967, 984 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J., dissenting)
("Technical, convoluted arguments are often advanced by the prosecution to save convictions
which are in many instances flawed by the prosecutor's . ..obsessive 'overkill' tactics.");
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting)
("Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will
gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking."), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
See generaly Alschuler, supra note 8.
85 See supra note 73.
86 Id.
87 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 631.
88 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 664 F.2d 257 (1 1th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ness, 652
F.2d 890 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); State v. Juarez, 111 Ariz. App. 119, 524
P.2d 155 (1974); People v. Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d 661, 104 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1972); Washam v.
State, 235 A.2d 279 (Del. 1967); People v. Gilyard, 124 Ill. App. 2d 95, 260 N.E.2d 364
(1970),cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971); State v. Miller, 288 N.C. 582, 220 S.E.2d 326 (1975).
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curative statements instructing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
conduct.89 Where a conviction is reversed, the reason given is usually
that the weight of the evidence was insufficient, 9° or that the trial judge
denied defense counsel's objection to improper prosecutorial state-
ments9! or gave insufficient cautionary instructions.
92
Because courts in reversing convictions do not focus on the motives
or behavior of the prosecutor, they do not induce prosecutors to comply
with trial rules regulating their conduct. Courts occasionally have con-
sidered the deliberateness of improper prosecutorial remarks as one fac-
tor in reversing a conviction. 93 Usually, however, courts note that such
deliberateness does not influence their decision either to reverse or to
affirm a conviction. 94 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected any con-
sideration of the prosecutor's bad faith in deciding whether to reverse a
conviction. 95 Thus, this improper conduct by prosecutors continues to
occur frequently despite admonitions of trial and appellate courts.
Some reviewing courts also are reluctant to reverse convictions
when the error consists of improper judicial remarks, unless the judge's
comments display extreme hostility and occur a number of times in the
same proceeding. 96 While disapproving of a trial judge's comments and
89 See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 534 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); Miller v. United
States, 410 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1969); People v. Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d 661, 104 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1972); People v. Gilkey, 181 Colo. 103, 507 P.2d 855 (1973); Swenson v. State, 525 P.2d 1395
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Macomber, 18 Or. App. 163, 524 P.2d 574 (1974); Thomas
v. State, 496 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1969); State v. Rhodes, 110
Ariz. 237, 517 P.2d 507 (1973); Young v. State, 280 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
People v. Helm, 9 Ill. App. 3d 143, 291 N.E.2d 680 (1973); Gregory v. Commonwealth, 557
S.W.2d 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
91 See, e.g., People v. McLean, 2 Ill. App. 3d 307, 276 N.E.2d 72 (1971).
92 See, e.g., State v. Cortez, 101 Ariz. 214, 418 P.2d 370 (1966); State v. Woodward, 21
Ariz. App. 133, 516 P.2d 589 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 475 Pa. 589, 381 A.2d 430
(1977).
93 People v. Whitlow, 89 Il1. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629 (1982); State v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 2d
67, 589 P.2d 634 (1979). There is, however, no trend toward reversing convictions for deliber-
ate courtroom misconduct.
94 See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 110 Ariz. at 238, 517 P.2d at 508; State v. Macomber, 18 Or.
App. at 169-70, 524 P.2d at 577.
95 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we believe the constitutional
obligation is measured by moral culpability, or the willfulness of the prosecutor."); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.'). The Supreme Court, indeed, recently rejected the possibility of reviewing a
conviction for prosecutorial misconduct where a harmless error standard was not applied:
"[T]he interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot be so lightly and casually
ignored in order to chastise what the court viewed as prosecutorial overreaching." United
States v. Hasting, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1979 (1983).
96 See, e.g., stipra notes 69-76 and accompanying text; see also People v. DeJesus, 42 N.Y.2d
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characterizing them as improper, reviewing courts usually apply the
harmless error standard and affirm the convictions. 97 Although review-
ing courts are more willing to reverse convictions because of judicial
improprieties than because of prosecutorial improprieties,98 when courts
fail to reverse these convictions they are sanctioning unlawful
behavior.99
Courts themselves are instruments of law enforcement. They must
preserve their own integrity. As Justice Brandeis noted in an oft quoted
dissent, courts must maintain respect for the law, promote confidence in
the administration of justice, and preserve the judicial process from
contamination: 100
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. 101
IV. AUTOMATIC REVERSALS UPON A SHOWING OF BAD FAITH
The current application of harmless error standards to violations of
trial rules regulating the conduct of prosecutors and judges has created
two pernicious effects. The affirmance of convictions obtained in viola-
tion of these rules discourages adherence to the rules. This lack of incen-
tive for lawful behavior gives rise to repeated violations resulting in a
systematic erosion of justice in the form of a high incidence of non-triv-
ial errors. An automatic reversal standard for these errors would moti-
vate prosecutors and trial judges to guard against such errors.
519, 521, 369 N.E.2d 752, 754, 399 N.Y.S. 196, 197 (1977) ("The trial was punctuated by the
trial court's frequent caustic, if not snide and sarcastic, remarks directed at defense counsel.").
97 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d at 1358; State v. Norris, 26 N.C. App. at
263, 215 SE.2d at 877; Commonwealth v. Marvel, 411 A.2d at 1256.
98 Courts sometimes cite instances of misconduct in appendices that they do not publish,
or refer to particular pages of unpublished trial records to support their findings of impropri-
ety, perhaps because of some fraternal feelings among judges. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 687,
690. In reversing convictions where prosecutorial error occurred, reviewing courts usually
focus on the weight of the evidence or the sufficiency of cautionary instructions. See, e.g. ,supra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text. Conversely, in reversing convictions where judicial mis-
conduct occurred, reviewing courts focus on the egregiousness of the misconduct. See, e.g.,
State v. Wendel, 532 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); People v. DeJesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 369
N.E.2d 752, 399 N.Y.S. 196 (1977); State v. Whitted, 38 N.C. App. 603, 248 S.E.2d 442
(1978).
99 Declaring mistrials more readily would also help deter such unlawful behavior. See
generally Alschuler, supra note 8, at 650-52.
100 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Alschuler,
supra note 8, at 633.
101 0nmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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A reviewing court should reverse a conviction upon a showing of a
deliberate violation of a clearly established trial rule promulgated to
regulate the behavior of a prosecutor or a judge. The standard should
be that the violator knew or should have known that his or her conduct
violated the rule. The rule should be deemed clearly established if a
reasonable prosecutor or trial judge would have been aware of the rule.
Examples of rules of which reasonable prosecutors and judges are aware
appear in the United States Attorneys' Manual and in court decisions of
the jurisdiction. An error that would trigger the reversal of a convic-
tion 10 2 should be a violation of a rule which prevents extraneous mat-
ters, upon which no evidence may be offered, from reaching the jury.
This category would exclude those errors to which the harmless error
rule was originally addressed: technical rules, ones which concern
"mere etiquette of trials"'0 3 and "formalities and minutiae of
procedure."104
This automatic reversal standard would promote more rational ver-
dicts. The jurors would not be exposed to confusing, unprovable infer-
ences. The defendant would not be forced into a tactical dilemma:
either objecting and asking for curative instructions, thus highlighting
the inferences of guilt, or ignoring the error in the hope that the jurors
will overlook it, thus risking that they will weigh the improper implica-
tions of guilt in their deliberations. This latter alternative is rendered
even more unattractive because failing to object usually leaves defend-
ants without recourse on appeal. 05
The most vigorous objection to this standard likely will be similar
to that voiced by a dissent in a Seventh Circuit case: the "[d]efendant's
guilt is starkly apparent."' 0 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed concern with "cost[ing] society the right to punish admitted of-
fenders,"' 0 7 and with not upsetting convictions of the "guilty."' 1 8 These
opinions, however, neglect a basic principle of constitutional law: a
defendant who is convicted in a trial tainted with errors which allow the
presentation of irrelevant matters to the jury, creating unprovable infer-
ences of guilt, is neither an admitted offender nor legally guilty.10 9 Re-
gardless of how "starkly apparent" the guilt of a defendant may be,
directed verdicts of guilty are not part of our criminal justice system.
Moreover, a reversal at this stage does not necessarily result in acquittal.
102 The trial judge could alternatively declare a mistrial.
103 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., State v. Murrell, 215 Kan. 10, 12-13, 523 P.2d 348, 350 (1974).
106 United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (1982).
108 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976).
109 See, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946).
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The proceeding would be remanded for another trial. Thus, if the de-
fendant's guilt is readily apparent, the jury will return a guilty verdict in
a trial free of improper inferences, and the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem will stand uncompromised.
Retrials do impose an economic burden to society, for trials are not
cost-free. There is, however, a countervailing societal benefit in revers-
ing convictions tainted with errors that compromise the administration
of justice. Courts must protect the integrity of their own functions if
society is to respect the legal process."10 Prosecutorial and judicial mis-
conduct occurs in open court where it is noticed by the public and the
press. Courts must demonstrate to the public that they will not be ac-
complices in willful disobedience of the law, and that they will not sanc-
tion disregard for the law. 1
The Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts to prevent judi-
cial sanctioning of illegal governmental conduct when this conduct
would have resulted in an abuse of governmental power. 112 When the
Supreme Court exercises this power, it raises the standard of fairness in
the administration of criminal justice in federal courts." 13 Often, the
standards the Supreme Court sets for the protection of procedural integ-
rity under its supervisory power become incorporated into the constitu-
tional concept of due process. Even without reaching the constitutional
level, states may follow, and indeed have followed, the lead of federal
courts to include such standards in their criminal trial systems. 114
Thus, the supervisory power affords the courts a basis for imple-
menting constitutional values beyond the minimum requirements of the
Constitution. 1 5 Applying an automatic reversal standard without ex-
amining whether the defendant was prejudiced is not without prece-
dent. In exercising its supervisory power, the Supreme Court has looked
beyond the effect of the outcome on the individual defendant to the
general effect on the administration of justice in the federal courts. 16
110 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Cortina,
630 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1980).
111 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 342 (1943).
112 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
113 See Note, supra note 6, at 1666-67. For a history of the Supreme Court's supervisory
power, see id.; see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
114 The McNabb rule, that any confession obtained by federal officers during illegal deten-
tion is inadmissible in federal court, does not apply to the states. Several states nevertheless
applied such rules. Congress, however, has the power to abolish such rules, because they are
not mandated by the Constitution.
115 Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisoiy Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 196, 214 (1969).
116 Id. at 195-96.
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For example, in McNabb v. United States, 17 the Supreme Court held that
any confession obtained by federal officers during an illegal detention
was inadmissible in federal court, and where such a confession was ad-
mitted, the conviction required reversal. The Court held that courts as
agencies of justice and custodians of liberty cannot affirm a conviction
where the government has acted unlawfully.1 18 In Elkins v. United
States,1 9 the Court held inadmissible evidence obtained by state officers
during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have vio-
lated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment. The Court thus invoked its supervisory
power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts to
strike down a conviction where the government had acted unlawfully.120
In United States v. Payner,121 the Court recently repudiated the use of
its supervisory power to suppress evidence tainted by illegalities if the
defendant's constitutional rights are not violated. The Court concluded
that the use of its supervisory power on these facts would upset the care-
ful balance of competing interests embodied in its fourth amendment
decisions. 122 This concern with the exclusion of probative evidence,
however, does not apply to deliberate courtroom misconduct, where
there is no need to balance deterring unlawful conduct against furnish-
ing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence. Here the two interests are
joined. Automatic reversals of deliberate courtroom misconduct would
assure that only relevant evidence reaches the trier of fact and at the
same time deter the unlawful conduct.
Federal appellate courts also apply an automatic reversal standard
to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. In United States v.
Cortina,123 the Seventh Circuit invoked its supervisory power to reverse a
conviction where an FBI agent had deliberately lied both in an affidavit
presented to support the search warrant and at trial on the witness
stand. The court found that when the truth-finding function of the
court is corrupted, the court must defend itself against deliberate viola-
tions of its own procedures. 24 There is a compelling need for courts to
prohibit the corruption of their truth-finding function by reversing con-
117 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
118 Id. at 347.
119 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
120 Id. at 216.
121 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
122 Id. at 733.
123 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).
124 Id. at 1217; see a/so In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973) (the court
reversed a civil contempt citation issued to a grand jury witness for failure to comply with a
subpoena, exercising its supervisory power to require a showing of relevance of the items
requested in order to guard against, improper government motives).
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victions upon a showing of deliberate courtroom misconduct.12 5
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that a prosecutor's conduct
may have such an unfair effect that it rises to a violation of due process.
In Brady v. Magland,12 6 the Court stated that a conviction must be re-
versed if the prosecution denies a defendant's request for specific evi-
dence containing facts material either to the guilt or to the punishment
of the accused. 127 If the prosecutor withholds such evidence when the
accused requests it, "[t]hat casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect
of a proceeding that does not comport with the standards of jus-
tice. .... "128 Similarly, the Court in Mooney v. Holohan 129 found that a
conviction based on perjured testimony must be reversed if the prosecu-
tor should have known of the perjury.1 30 The Court explained that de-
priving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of the
court and the jury by the presentation of testimony known to be per-
jured was inconsistent with the demands of justice. 13 1
Automatic reversals of convictions upon a showing of deliberate
misconduct at trial would prompt prosecutors and trial judges to guard
against such errors. Although the research is inconclusive regarding the
effectiveness of a similar doctrine created to deter unlawful police be-
havior, 132 disciplining prosecutors and trial judges by ordering reversals
can be distinguished in several ways from disciplining police officers by
excluding evidence at trial. First, the burden of retrial falls on the prose-
cutor and the trial judge. If prosecutors or judges commit reversible
errors they must, in effect, repeat their efforts. 133 Further, both prosecu-
tors and trial judges are members of the legal profession. A reversal for
misconduct will likely be perceived as a public reprimand. By the same
token, assistant district attorneys' superiors follow appellate opinions
closely, whereas a police officer's superiors do not regularly read such
opinions.1 34 Finally, while police officers are more concerned with the
number of arrests than with the number of convictions, 135 a prosecutor's
conviction record often is perceived as a measure of his or her
125 See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980).
126 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
127 Id. at 87.
128 Id. at 88.
129 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
130 Id. at 112.
131 Id.
132 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970);
cf. Mertens and Wasserstrom, Foreword- The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusiona.y Rule: De-
regulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. UJ. 365 (1981).
133 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 647. But see, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 18 (A different judge will
be assigned on retrial).





Thus, reversals upon a showing of deliberate courtroom misconduct
will reduce the incidence of such conduct. Other disciplinary methods
have proven ineffective.1 3 7 Even if the courtroom misconduct rises to
the constitutional level of violating the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the defendant cannot sue the prosecutor or trial judge for damages be-
cause prosecutors and trial judges currently enjoy absolute immunity
from civil liability. 138 It is possible to hold prosecutors in contempt of
court for misconduct. Such citations, however, are uncommon. 139 If the
judge does not hold the prosecutor in contempt, the defendant cannot
appeal. Disbarment of prosecutors or impeachment of judges is also not
a viable alternative. It would help stop deliberate trial errors, but would
impose a disproportionate cost on the individuals bringing the suits.
Further, such extreme sanctions are almost never enforced.140
V. CONCLUSION
The harmless error standards as currently applied in review of
criminal trials are eroding the integrity of the criminal justice system by
encouraging violations of longstanding trial rules. The application of an
automatic reversal standard to deliberate violations of such rules would
reduce the incidence of such violations. The corresponding costs would
not be great: because prosecutors and trial judges are sensitive to rever-
sals, few reversals would be necessary to effect the desired result. More-
over, preserving a constitutional criminal justice system does not
automatically set offenders at large: Ernesto Miranda was convicted at
retrial. 141
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